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OF SECTION 904.04(2)
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin courts have uniformly held that evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct1 is inadmissible to establish the defendant's general character, dis-
position or criminal propensity.2 Following the lead of the federal
jurisdiction,3 the Wisconsin legislature adopted this fundamental principle
and codified it in Wisconsin Statute Section 904.04(2). Section 904.04(2)
states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. 4
1. The phrase "uncharged misconduct" denotes acts that are not charged in the indictment or
information for which the defendant is currently on trial. Comment, Admission of Evidence of
Other Misconduct in Washington to Prove Intent or Absence of Mistake or Accident: The Logical
Inconsistencies of Evidence Rule 404(b), 61 WASH. L. REv. 1213, 1213 n.4 (1986). "Uncharged
misconduct" is more commonly known as "other crimes, wrongs, or acts." Since the phrase
uncharged misconduct characterizes this evidence more accurately, this Comment will substitute
the phrase "uncharged misconduct" for the phrase "other crimes, wrongs, or acts." Although
this evidence is also admissible in civil cases, this Comment will focus on the admissibility of this
evidence in criminal cases.
2. See Fossdahl v. State, 89 Wis. 482, 485, 62 N.W. 185, 186 (1895); Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7,
15-16, 38 N.W. 177, 179 (1888). All American jurisdictions agree that uncharged misconduct
evidence cannot be admitted solely to show propensity. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[04] (1988).
3. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
4. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1987-88) (effective January 1, 1974). Section 904.04(2) is virtually
the same in meaning as Section 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. State v. Schindler, 146
Wis. 2d 47, 53, 429 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Ct. App. 1988). Federal Rules of Evidence Section 404(b)
States:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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The doctrine of uncharged misconduct is the most litigated' and fre-
quently misapplied evidentiary doctrine.6 Although the character7 evidence
rule appears clear on its face,' its application has proven troublesome for
Wisconsin courts.9 Section 904.04(2) prohibits the use of uncharged mis-
conduct evidence to show that the defendant has conformed to his/her
character on the particular occasion in question. In contrast, such evidence
is admissible if the prosecutor offers it for a legitimate purpose; for example,
to prove motive or intent.
In order for uncharged misconduct evidence to be admissible under cur-
rent Wisconsin law, it must pass a two-prong test. ° In applying the first
prong, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is introduced
for a purpose other than to demonstrate character." The second prong
requires the trial court to ascertain whether the probative value of the evi-
dence substantially outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant. 2 Implicit in this test is the rule that the uncharged misconduct
5. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, 404[08]; Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory
for Admitting Evidence of the Defendant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the
Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) ("The federal rule codifying the
doctrine, Rule 404(b), has generated more reported decisions than any other subsection of the
Federal Rules.").
6. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise ofAll: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 255 (1987).
7. For a discussion of the possible definitions of "character" or lack thereof, see J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, 404[01]; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5233 (1978); Blinka, Evidence of Character, Habit, and
"Similar Acts" in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 285-89 (1989-90) (lack of a pre-
cise definition makes it exceedingly difficult to distinguish the permissible purposes for which
uncharged misconduct evidence may be offered from the impermissible purposes).
8. It is possible that the language of the rule is too clear and simple. Perhaps this area of law
is too complex for a rule of such simplicity.
9. Vanlue v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 92-93, 291 N.W.2d 467, 472 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., dis-
senting). This Comment will focus on Wisconsin law even though most state and federal courts
have similar problems. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
10. State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 254, 378 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1985); State v. Pharr, 115
Wis. 2d 334, 343-45, 340 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1983); State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 729, 324
N.W.2d 426, 429 (1982).
11. The language of Section 904.04(2) indicates that this is a rule of inclusion rather than a
rule of exclusion. Thus, the terms listed in Section 904.04(2) are illustrative of the types of uses
not prohibited by the general rule. However, courts typically phrase the rule as one of exclusion.
For instance, the first prong of the court's two-prong test is generally couched in terms of whether
the evidence fits within one of the "exceptions" listed in Section 904.04(2). See, e.g., Fishnick, 127
Wis. 2d at 254, 378 N.W.2d at 276; Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343, 340 N.W.2d at 502; Alsteen, 108
Wis. 2d at 729, 324 N.W.2d at 429. Instead, the determination should rest on whether the evi-
dence is offered for a purpose other than to demonstrate character. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 7, § 5240, at 470-71.
12. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 254, 378 N.W.2d at 276; Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343, 340 N.W.2d
at 502; Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d at 729, 324 N.W.2d at 429. The judicial council committee's note to
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evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case.13 Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that some courts have admitted evidence that has failed the two-
prong test.14 Thus, evidence of uncharged misconduct has been admitted
even though: (1) it is not relevant to an issue in the case; (2) its only pur-
pose is to prove the defendant's character; and (3) its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice."
This Comment will explore the provisions of Section 904.04(2). Next, it
will discuss Wisconsin case law concerning uncharged misconduct evidence
and analyze the problems surrounding the doctrine.16 Finally, this Com-
ment will advocate a change from the court's two-prong test to a three-
prong test, as well as formulate new standards for courts to follow when
faced with uncharged misconduct evidence.
II. BACKGROUND
The admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is so potentially dam-
aging to the defendant that this type of evidence is frequently referred to as
Section 904.04(2) states that evidence of uncharged misconduct is not automatically admissible
and should be excluded if the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value under § 904.03. Wis. R. EVID., cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79 (1973); see also FED. R. EvID. 404
advisory committee's note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R81 (1973).
13. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 254, 378 N.W.2d at 276; Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 344, 340 N.W.2d
at 502; Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d at 729, 324 N.W.2d at 429. This Comment will advocate a change
from the court's two-prong test to a three-prong test. In the proposed three-prong test, the first
prong requires that the uncharged misconduct evidence be relevant to an issue in the case. The
second prong requires the trial court to determine if the evidence is offered for a purpose other
than to prove propensity. In applying the third prong, the trial court must determine if the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
Although this test is similar to the court's two-prong test, its focus is different. In the two-
prong test, the determination of relevancy was "implicit." However, because the focus was not on
the relevancy aspect, character evidence that was irrelvant has been analyzed and admitted under
the two-prong test. See, e.g., State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 434 n.7, 407 N.W.2d 256, 261 n.6a
(1987) (discussing the trial court's analysis of the first prong of the two-prong test the court stated,
"[i]t is arguable that the prior crimes evidence at issue in this case was of such little relevance on
the issue of Ever's intent that it could have been excluded at this stage of the analysis").
Instead of holding that relevancy is "implicit" in the test, the proposed three-prong test explic-
itly states that the evidence must be relevant. Since this forces the trial court to directly focus on
the issue of relevancy at this stage, evidence that is irrelevant will be deemed inadmissible before
further analysis under Section 904.04(2) is performed.
14. See generally infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text.
15. This is a serious problem in other jurisdictions as well. See generally S. SALTZBURG & K.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (4th ed. 1986).
16. This Comment will analyze cases that involve allegations of sexual misconduct and cases
that do not. When determining the admissibility of character evidence in Wisconsin, these two
types of cases are analyzed differently. Cases involving allegations of sexual misconduct are ana-
lyzed under a "greater latitude" standard. See infra notes 148-58 and 173-75 and accompanying
text. This Comment will advocate the abolition of this standard.
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the "prosecutor's delight." 17 The admission of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence can be the turning point in a trial. In fact, many experienced defense
attorneys will change their entire trial strategy to prevent its introduction."i
This section will examine the purposes and scope of this powerful line of
evidence.
A. Purpose of Section 904.04(2)
The purpose of the uncharged misconduct evidence rule is to prohibit
the introduction of evidence solely to establish the defendant's criminal pro-
pensity.19 The rule therefore prevents the admission of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith.
The exclusion of this evidence is based on general relevancy principles, ra-
tional policy decisions and constitutional concerns.
1. Relevancy Concerns
One reason for the general exclusion of uncharged misconduct evidence
is its minimal probative value in proving conduct in a particular instance.2"
This exclusion is supported by psychological research which indicates that a
person's character is a poor predictor of his/her behavior. 21 Studies indi-
cate that there is little correlation between a person's character and his/her
conduct at a particular time.22 Thus, introducing uncharged misconduct
evidence for the sole purpose of establishing that the defendant conformed
to his/her character at the time in question is usually not probative of any
fact in issue and must be excluded for failing the general test of relevancy.2 3
Even when the evidence is relevant, the inference is often weak.24
17. Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 2; Elliot, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact Evi-
dence-I, 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 284; Nevin, Other Crimes as Proof of Guilt, 26 ADvoc. IDAHO ST.
B. 20, 20 (Nov. 1983) (uncharged misconduct evidence is potentially more damaging in many
cases than a defendant's confession).
18. E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:02 (1989).
19. State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 378 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1985) (quoting State v.
Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 100, 252 N.W.2d 94, 99 (1977)).
20. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239.
21. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 2:18; see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
7, § 5239-40.
22. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 2:18.
23. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 434 n.7, 407 N.W.2d 256, 261 n.6a (1987)
(evidence that the defendant had committed prior thefts introduced to prove that the defendant
had the requisite intent to commit the charged theft probably of such little relevance that it should
have been excluded).
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2. Policy Concerns
There are also policy reasons for restricting the admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence. It appears that it is difficult for jurors to confine this
evidence to the legitimate purpose for which it is offered. The danger arises
when the jury begins to make legally impermissible inferences from the
evidence.25
The first inference inherent in this evidence is that because the defend-
ant committed a prior act, s/he has the propensity to commit such acts.26
This induces the jury to focus on the defendant's character, which in turn
tempts the jury to convict the defendant not because s/he is guilty of the
charged crime, but because the defendant is a bad person and deserves pun-
ishment.27 For instance, if the defendant is charged with robbery and at
trial the prosecution introduces evidence of other robberies the defendant
has committed, the jury may infer that the defendant has the propensity to
commit robbery. Thus, in the eyes of the jury, the defendant is a bad per-
son and should be convicted regardless of the crime charged. Implicit in
this inference is the possibility that the jury may decide to punish the de-
fendant simply for escaping punishment in the past.28 Therefore, under the
facts given above, the jury may conclude that since the defendant has the
propensity to commit robbery, the defendant has committed other robberies
that have gone undetected and must be punished for those crimes, regard-
less of the crime charged.2 9
The second inference which arises from the use of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence is that because the defendant has a bad character or a propen-
sity to commit such acts, the defendant committed the charged crime.3"
25. See State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 83, 341 N.W.2d 639, 650 (1984) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
26. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 2:18.
27. Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 3; see also Nevins, supra note 17, at 20; Patterson, Evidence
of Pror Bad Acts: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 331, 333 (1986).
28. Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1967), cert. denied sub nom.,
Whitty v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 959 (1968). ("the tendency to condemn not because he is believed
guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped punishment from other offenses"). This is
particularly unsettling when the uncharged misconduct which triggers the jury hostility is a mere
moral wrong. Id
29. Likewise, the evidence may induce the jury to convict the defendant because the defend-
ant escaped punishment for the uncharged crime. For example, if the prosecution introduces
evidence of an uncharged crime which cannot be prosecuted for some reason (such as a theft
barred from prosecution by the statute of limitations), the jury may unfairly convict the defendant
because of the uncharged misconduct and not the crime charged.
30. State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 657, 247 N.W.2d 696, 702 (1976) (a jury may determine
that since the defendant did it before, the defendant did it again); see also E. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 18, § 2:18; H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEiSEL, THE AMERicAN JURY 390 n.9 (1966).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is extremely diffi-
cult for juries to separate the permissible from the impermissible uses of
uncharged misconduct evidence.3'
These inferences, in effect, destroy the presumption of innocence. This
has prompted researchers to note that the presumption of innocence is only
effective for defendants without prior criminal records. 32 Because this evi-
dence may effectively induce the jury to convict a defendant based on char-
acter rather than the specific crime charged, policy reasons support the
restriction of uncharged misconduct evidence. 33
3. Constitutional Concerns
There are also constitutional concerns requiring strict limits on the ad-
missibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. Scholars have noted that a
number of constitutional protections are potentially jeopardized when un-
charged misconduct evidence is introduced.34 Constitutional guarantees35
that may be violated include: the privilege against self-incrimination;36 the
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness; 37 the prohibition of double
jeopardy;38 and the due process right requiring proof of guilt beyond a rea-
31. Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 99-100, 94 N.W. 771, 774 (1903) ("[E]ven the trained
judicial mind can hardly exclude the fact of previous bad character or criminal tendency, and
prevent its having effect to swerve such mind toward accepting conclusion of guilt. Much less can
it be expected that jurors can escape such effect."); see also Note, Evidence: Prior Crimes Used to
Show Specific Intent and Identity, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 133 (1966).
32. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 30, at 179; see also State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d
424, 445, 407 N.W.2d 256, 265 (1987) ("a thief is to be held to different and higher standards on
the guilt phase of a crime than is a person with an unblemished record").
33. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The federal court stated,
"[i]t is fundamental to American jurisprudence that 'a defendant must be tried for what he did,
not who he is.'" Id. at 523 (quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978)).
34. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239; Patterson, supra note 27, at
336.
35. For an excellent analysis of the constitutional privileges placed in jeopardy by the intro-
duction of uncharged misconduct evidence, see Patterson, supra note 27, at 336-39.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Wis. CONST. art. I, sec. 8; see also
Payne, The Law Whose Life is Not Logic: Evidence of Other Crimes in Criminal Cases, 3 U. RICH.
L. REV. 62, 68 (1968); Note, supra note 31, at 140. Self-incrimination can occur when the defend-
ant is forced to take the stand to minimize or explain the uncharged misconduct. C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239.
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Wis. CONST. art. I, sec. 8; see also
Umbaugh v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (un-
charged misconduct must be rationally connected to the charged crime in order to be consistent
with due process requirements).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WIS. CONST. art. I, sec. ,8; see also
Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on the "Prosecutor's Delight," 21 UCLA L.
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sonable doubt.3 9 These constitutional provisions are fundamental to the
American adversarial system and should not be jeopardized, particularly if
based upon evidence that may have little probative value. Trial. courts must
recognize the constitutional considerations when deciding this issue.
It is important to note that, while sound reasons support the general
exclusion of uncharged misconduct evidence, there are instances in which
this evidence is admissible if offered for limited and legitimate purposes,
such as those listed in Section 904.04(2). As a word of caution, it is impera-
tive that trial courts consider the above interests when determining the ad-
missibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.
B. Scope of Section 904.04(2)
Although sound reasons support the general exclusion of uncharged
misconduct evidence,' this evidence is admissible when offered for pur-
poses other than to show character.41 Such purposes include42 proof of
motive,43 opportunity," intent,45 plan,46 preparation, 47 knowledge,48
REv. 892, 914 (1974) (double jeopardy may occur when the defendant was previously acquitted of
the uncharged misconduct).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WIS. CONST. art. I, see. 8; see also C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239 (the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt may be destroyed if the jury convicts because of the multiplicity of the accusations and not
because of the charged crime).
40. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
41. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1987-88); see also Wis. R. EvID. 904.04(2) judicial council com-
mittee's note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79 (1973).
42. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1987-88).
43. See, eg., State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 21-22, 398 N.W.2d 763, 772 (1987) (uncharged
misconduct evidence admissible because it illuminated the defendant's motive); State v. Conley,
141 Wis. 2d 384, 400, 416 N.W.2d 69, 75 (Ct. App. 1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom., Wisconsin v. Conley, 487 U.S. 1230, (1988) (uncharged misconduct demonstrated a
motive for defendant's sexual conduct with his daughter).
44. See, eg., Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 284 N.W.2d 666, 673 (1979) (defendant
created the opportunity to carry out the plan).
45. See, e.g., Conley, 141 Wis. 2d at 400, 416 N.W.2d at 75 (intent was an element of the
charged crime and uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible when the evidence is probative in
establishing an element of the charged crime).
46. See, e.g., Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 23, 398 N.W.2d at 773 (uncharged misconduct demon-
strated the defendant's plan to achieve sexual gratification from young girls); Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d
at 70, 341 N.W.2d at 644 (uncharged misconduct demonstrated defendant's plan to select bur-
glary victims by means of funeral notices).
47. The courts generally treat preparation and plan as synonymous. See Rutchik, 116 Wis.
2d at 68, 341 N.W.2d at 643; State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 340 N.W.2d 498, 500 (1983);
State v. Harris, 123 Wis. 2d 231, 238, 365 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Ct. App. 1984). But see State v.
Goldsmith, 122 Wis. 2d 754, 757, 364 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1985).
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identity,49 or absence of mistake or accident.50 Wisconsin courts have held
that this list is only illustrative.5
The scope of Section 904.04(2) is quite broad. Based on the phrase
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts" used in Section 904.04(2), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has determined that the scope of the uncharged misconduct
doctrine is not limited to other criminal acts.5 Thus, evidence will not be
rejected simply because the uncharged misconduct is not defined as a
crime.5 3 Instead, evidence of any act that meets the requirements of the
48. State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 436-37, 407 N.W.2d 256, 261-62 (1987) (evidence was
admissible under the knowledge exception to rebut the defense that the defendant believed the
property was abandoned).
49. See, e.g., Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260, 378 N.W.2d at 279 (the similarity between the
defendant's uncharged misconduct and the charged crime identified defendant as the attacker);
Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 814, 235 N.W.2d at 534, 537 (1975) (evidence that defendant
preferred virgins was so similar to the attacker's preference for virgins that uncharged misconduct
evidence identified the defendant as the attacker).
50. See, e.g., Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 276, 298 N.W.2d 820, 823 (1980), cert. denied
sub nom., Barrera v. Wisconsin, 451 U.S. 972 (1981) (evidence of subsequent shooting was rele-
vant to rebut the defense that the charged shooting was an accident); Christianson v. Lease As-
soc., 87 Wis. 2d 123, 128-29, 273 N.W.2d 776, 779 (1978); State v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 245
N.W.2d 687, 693 (1976) (uncharged misconduct evidence was admissible to negate the defense
that defendant's failure to deposit withholding taxes was the result of mistake or accident).
51. State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 119
Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984); see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5340.
Courts have suggested several other permissible purposes. For example, uncharged misconduct
evidence is admissible to "furnish part of the context of the crime or [when it] is necessary to a
'full presentation' of the case .... " Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 236, 341 N.W.2d at 720 (quoting
United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted)). It can be admitted
for purposes of impeachment in accordance with Section 906.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 76, 341 N.W.2d at 646; Wis. STAT. § 906.09 (1987-88). The Eighth
Circuit has also held that evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to show the victim's
fear. See United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 800 (8th Cir. 1980).
52. Simpson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 494, 266 N.W.2d 270 (1978). For a comparative analysis of
the federal jurisdiction, see J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, 404.
53. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, 404[08]. In Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 291,
149 N.W.2d at 564, the court rejected the argument that the acts must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt; however, it did not set forth the standard of proof for admissibility. In State v. Schin-
dler, 146 Wis. 2d 47, 52, 429 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Ct. App. 1988), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
adopted the test used by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681 (1988). This approach permits the use of uncharged misconduct evidence if the court,
after examining all the evidence, concludes that a jury could reasonably find the uncharged act by
the preponderance of the evidence. Schindler, 146 Wis. 2d at 54, 429 N.W.2d at 113.
The standard of proof courts most frequently apply is the clear and convincing standard. See,
e.g., United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 448-49 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039
(1984); United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1983); Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d
889, 892 (6th Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976) (the court employed a preponderance of the evidence standard).
In general, scholars tend to support the clear and convincing standard of proof. See, e.g., Pro-
posed Rules by the ABA Committee, 120 F.R.D. 299, 332 (1988) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]
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uncharged misconduct evidence rule is admissible. 4 Moreover, the evi-
dence is not limited to prior acts but also includes acts committed subse-
quent to the charged crime as well.5"
Section 904.04(2) also allows the defendant to introduce evidence of a
third party's misconduct. It discusses evidence used "to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."56
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has determined that the term "person"
includes defendants, co-defendants, witnesses and third parties.57 Evidence
introduced by the defendant is subject to the limitations set forth in Section
904.04(2).58
Generally, uncharged misconduct evidence may be introduced in either
the state's case-in-chief or rebuttal.5 9 However, under certain circum-
stances, the prosecution may be precluded altogether from introducing this
evidence. For example, the availability of other, less prejudicial evidence is
a factor in determining the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence.' If other evidence is available to the state, the uncharged miscon-
(supporting the use of the clear and convincing standard); Patterson, supra note 27, at 349-62
(highly critical of the preponderance of the evidence standard and advocating the clear and con-
vincing standard).
54. See, eg., State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 320, 421 N.W.2d 96, 105 (1988) (prosecution
introduced evidence of defendant's homosexuality to suggest a motive for murder); Hough, 70
Wis. 2d at 812, 235 N.W.2d at 537 (prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant had made
statements regarding his sexual preferences to show identity).
55. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 346, 340 N.W.2d at 503 (evidence of a subsequent shooting was
admissible to explain a previous shooting for which the defendant was standing trial).
There is a conflict among jurisdictions on this issue. One view is to exclude all subsequent
acts. Another view is to allow proof of subsequent acts only if there is proof of prior acts as well.
The third view, which is the view adopted by Wisconsin, is to admit evidence of subsequent acts
when they are logically relevant. See, eg., E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 2:11 (of the three
views, the third one is the soundest). The federal jurisdiction also follows the third view. See
United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1979).
56. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1987-88) (emphasis added).
57. State v. Oberlander, 143 Wis. 2d 825, 833, 422 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 438 N.W.2d 580 (1989). In Oberlander, the defendant attempted
to introduce evidence of another party's past acts in order to set up a third party defense. Id. at
836, 422 N.W.2d at 885. The trial court prohibited the introduction of the evidence and the
appellate court reversed the decision. On review, the supreme court reversed the appellate court's
decision because it determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
uncharged misconduct evidence was irrelevant. State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 422
N.W.2d 881 (1989). Despite the fact that the supreme court reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion, the supreme court case does not stand for the proposition that other acts committed by a
third party are inadmissible.
58. Oberlander, 143 Wis. 2d at 832, 422 N.W.2d at 885.
59. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 17, 398 N.W.2d at 770; see also J. WEINST=IN & M. BURGER,
supra note 2, 404[09].
60. Harris, 123 Wis. 2d at 236, 365 N.W.2d at 925.
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duct evidence may not be admissible. Furthermore, uncharged misconduct
evidence must be used sparingly and only when reasonably necessary.6" In
fact, the court has warned prosecutors, that "[p]iling on such evidence as a
final 'kick at the cat' when sufficient evidence is already in the record runs
the danger, if such evidence is admitted, of violating the defendant's right to
a fair trial ....62
Finally, there is nothing in Section 904.04(2) that limits the rule's scope
to criminal cases. 63 Thus, uncharged misconduct evidence is also admissi-
ble in civil trials.' This evidence may be especially instrumental in both
tort65 and commercial law.66 Of course, the limitations found in criminal
cases apply in civil cases as well.67
C. Wisconsin Case Law
In almost every case involving uncharged misconduct, Wisconsin courts
have restated their long standing commitment to the inadmissibility of
character evidence to show criminal propensity. Nevertheless, a brief re-
view of Wisconsin case law will demonstrate that a few courts have strayed
from the underlying principles of this line of law evidence.
Wisconsin courts have been wrestling with the problem created by un-
charged misconduct evidence for over 100 years.6" Prior to 1969, the test to
admit uncharged misconduct evidence involved only the first prong of what
61. State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 103, 252 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1977) (quoting Whitty, 34
Wis. 2d at 297, 149 N.W.2d at 565-66).
62. Id.; see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
63. This is consistent with the interpretation of Section 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239.
64. See Blinka, supra note 7, at 206; see also G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 168-71 (2d ed. 1987); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 15, at 188; J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, 1i 404[03]. Although uncharged misconduct evidence is also
admissible in civil cases, this Comment will focus on the admissibility of this evidence in criminal
cases.
65. In a products liability suit based on a design defect, a plaintiff may admit, under certain
circumstances, evidence of other accidents caused by similarly designed products. E. IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 1:01.
66. For example, a party may introduce evidence of previous contracts in a dispute regarding
the actual formation of the contract. 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 371 (Chadbourn
rev. 1979).
67. Id.
68. Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 14, 38 N.W. 177, 179 (1888). In 1903, Justice Dodge stated:
[Olne cannot be deemed to have had fairly tried before a jury the question of his guilt of
the offense charged when their minds have been prejudiced by proof of bad character of
accused or former misconduct, and thus diverted and perverted from a deliberate and im-
partial consideration of the question whether the real evidentiary facts fasten guilt upon
him beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 99, 94 N.W. 771, 774 (1903).
UNCHANGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
is now known as the Wisconsin Supreme Court's two-prong test.69 In other
words, Wisconsin courts were only concerned with whether the evidence
was offered for a purpose other than to show propensity as prohibited by
the general rule. In 1967, the court decided Whitty v. State,70 which estab-
lished a procedure to determine the admissibility of this evidence. First, the
court listed six legitimate purposes for introducing uncharged misconduct
evidence.71 Second, the court adopted the balancing test which is now the
second prong of the court's two-prong test.72 The balancing test requires
the trial court to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its preju-
dicial nature.7 If the prejudicial nature of the evidence substantially out-
weighs its probative value, the evidence must be excluded.74 Seven years
after Whitty was decided, Section 904.04(2) went into effect, 75  basically
adopting the fundamental principles announced in Whitty.
76
Although Section 904.04(2) and case law prohibit the introduction of
uncharged misconduct evidence to establish criminal propensity, such evi-
dence is still admitted for that purpose. For example, in State v. Tarrell,77 it
appears that uncharged misconduct evidence was introduced for impermis-
sible reasons. In Tarrell, the defendant was convicted of indecent behavior
with a child.78 At trial, the state introduced other instances of the defend-
ant's prior crimes and bad acts: a 1969 conviction for enticing a child for
immoral purposes; a 1973 incident in which the defendant unzipped his
pants and masturbated in front of two young female hitchhikers; and a 1974
incident in which the defendant made an inappropriate statement to a girl.
79
In affirming the trial court's decision to introduce this evidence, the Tarrell
69. Note, Evidence of Prior Misconduct: Whitty v. State, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 104, 106 (1967).
For a discussion of the court's two-prong test, see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
70. 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert denied sub nom., Whitty v. Wisconsin, 390
U.S. 959 (1968). In Wisconsin, the uncharged misconduct doctrine is frequently referred to as the
Whitty rule. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 275, 278, 212 N.W.2d 481, 482 (1973).
71. Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 292, 149 N.W.2d at 563. These purposes are elements of a specific
crime charged, intent, identity, system of criminal activity, impeachment of credibility, and char-
acter (if put in issue by the defendant). Id.
72. Id. at 294, 149 N.W.2d at 564-65.
73. See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text.
74. Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294, 149 N.W.2d at 564-65. It should be noted that the court
adopted Rule 303 of the American Law Instute, Model Code of Evidence. Id.
75. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1987-88) (effective January 1, 1974).
76. Wis. R. EVID. 904.04(2) judicial council committee's note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79
(1973). Section 904.04(2) had little direct impact on subsequent case law since it simply codified
the basic principles set forth in Whitty.
77. 74 Wis. 2d 647, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976).
78. Id. at 649, 247 N.W.2d at 698.
79. Id. at 657, 247 N.W.2d at 702. The defendant was never convicted of the 1973 and 1974
incidents.
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court stated: "the separate acts, ranging from inappropriate comments to a
girl, to enticing a minor for immoral purposes, demonstrated [defendant's]
propensity to act out his sexual desires with young girls and had a logical
connection with the charged offense."8 The above emphasized language
suggests that uncharged misconduct evidence may be used to establish the
defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. However, this prac-
tice is clearly prohibited by Section 904.04(2).
In Vanlue v. State,81 it appears that uncharged misconduct evidence was
also introduced for impermissible reasons. Vanlue was convicted of posses-
sion of burglarious tools.812 The trial court permitted the state to introduce
evidence of the defendant's two prior burglary convictions under the theory
that the prior convictions proved that Vanlue possessed burglarious tools
with the necessary intent.8 3
Although intent was an issue in this case, there was a question as to
whether the evidence was actually probative of intent.14 The court sug-
gested that the previous convictions were probative of the element of intent
because they proved the defendant had knowledge of what tools could be
used in a burglary." However, as the dissent argued, knowledge of what
tools could be used for a burglary does not prove that the defendant had the
requisite intent to steal. s6 In other words, one cannot infer that since the
defendant had knowledge of what tools could be used in a burglary, the
defendant had the requisite intent to steal without first inferring that the
defendant has a bad disposition. 7 This practice circumvents the first line of
Section 904.04(2), which provides that evidence of uncharged misconduct is
80. Id. at 658, 247 N.W.2d at 703 (emphasis added). This language was later withdrawn in
State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1985).
81. 96 Wis. 2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).
82. The burglary tools consisted of a crowbar, a penknife, a pillowcase and a pair of gloves.
Id. at 83, 291 N.W.2d at 468.
83. Id. One burglary occurred in September of 1974, two years and six months prior to the
charged crime. The other burglary occurred in January of 1975, two years and two months prior
to the charged crime. Id. at 94, 291 N.W.2d at 473 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
84. Intent is an element of the charged crime of possession of burglarious tools. Wis. STAT.
§ 943.12 (1987-88).
85. Vanlue, 96 Wis. 2d at 87, 291 N.W.2d at 470.
86. Id. at 94, 291 N.W.2d at 473 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). As the dissent stated,
"[k]nowledge of what tools are useful for burglary is not the equivalent of intent to burglarize. I
know what tools could be used in a burglary from reading the Wisconsin Reports." Id.; see also
Vanlue v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 455, 459-60, 275 N.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Ct. App. 1978), rev'd, 96 Wis.
2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980) (holding state's contention that evidence was admitted to show
intent and not character was a fiction).
87. For a discussion of the legally impermissible inferences a jury may make from this type of
evidence, see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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not admissible to show the character of a person in order to demonstrate
that s/he acted in conformity therewith.
In State v. Fishnick,8 the court withdrew the "propensity language" in
Tarrell9 after discussing the possible effects it could have on the general
rule that excludes uncharged misconduct evidence to prove criminal pro-
pensity.9" Though the court rejected this language, it reached the same re-
sult as in Tarrell.
In Fishnick, the defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault.
The defendant allegedly induced C.S., a three year old girl, into his trailer
where he intentionally touched her vaginal area.91 At trial, the prosecution
was permitted to introduce evidence that seven days prior to the charged
incident with C.S., the defendant allegedly offered D.F., a thirteen year old
girl, twenty dollars to go into his trailer and expose her vaginal area to
him.92  This evidence was introduced, inter alia, to show motive.
93
Fishnick's defense to the charged crime was that the crime did not occur.94
Under these circumstances, the jury was allowed to make legally imper-
missible inferences before reaching the conclusion that a crime did actually
occur. The jury may have inferred from this evidence that the defendant
had the propensity to commit the crime, and based on that inference, that
he committed the alleged crime. If the jury made these impermissible infer-
ences, the defendant was arguably denied a fair trial, thus violating his con-
stitutional rights.
Although the Wisconsin cases involving uncharged misconduct evi-
dence purport to adhere to the general character evidence rule, this brief
analysis demonstrates that some courts, contrary to the general rule, appear
to have permitted the state to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence to
88. 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985).
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 255, 378 N.W.2d at 277.
91. Id. at 250, 378 N.W.2d at 274.
92. Id. The prosecution also called E.F., a twelve year old girl, who testified that eight days
prior to the charged incident she saw the defendant stand nude in front of his window so that she
could see his penis. Id. at 252, 378 N.W.2d at 275. On appeal, the prosecution conceded that the
exposure testimony by E.F. was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to any issue in the case.
However, the supreme court held that it was a harmless error. Id. at 266, 378 N.W.2d at 282.
For an explanation of the harmless error doctrine, see State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370
N.W.2d 222 (1985).
93. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 252, 378 N.W.2d at 278.
94. Id. at 258, 378 N.W.2d at 278. The court also relied on the identity exception. Id. at 263,
378 N.W.2d at 280. For a discussion of the motive exception, see infra notes 159-76 and accom-
panying text.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
show propensity.95 The next section of this Comment will examine how
courts have analyzed uncharged misconduct evidence under each prong of
the test, and will suggest how courts should resolve these issues in the
future.
III. THE PROPOSED THREE-PRONG TEST
To ascertain whether uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible, the
trial court should apply a three-prong test.96 The first prong would require
the trial judge to determine if the evidence is relevant. If the evidence is not
probative of an issue in the case, the evidence must be excluded and there is
no need for the trial judge to analyze the evidence under the remaining two
prongs. To satisfy the second prong, the trial judge should determine if the
evidence is introduced for a purpose other than to show criminal propen-
sity. If the only reason offered for admissibility is to demonstrate criminal
propensity, the evidence must be excluded. The third prong consists of a
balancing test. The trial judge should balance the probative value of the
evidence against any unfair prejudice to the defendant. If the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value, the evidence is
inadmissible.
A. The First Prong - Relevancy
The first prong of the test involves the determination of relevancy. Trial
judges should require prosecutors to articulate their theories of relevancy at
this stage. Judges should require more from the prosecution than a recital
of the buzzwords from Section 904.04(2). Prosecutors must explain why
the evidence is probative and why it is of consequence. If the judge deter-
mines that the evidence is relevant, s/he must then make the appropriate
findings under the second prong. If the judge deems the evidence irrele-
vant, further analysis is unwarranted. Forcing prosecutors to articulate
their theories of relevancy also sets the record for any subsequent appeal.
The Wisconsin Legislature has defined relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." 97 In other words, evidence is rele-
95. This is not to be confused with the argument that a showing of propensity is inherent
when using this evidence for a purpose other than to demonstrate propensity. Friedrich, 135 Wis.
2d at 28, 398 N.W.2d at 775.
96. For a discussion of the supreme court's two-prong test, see supra notes 10-13 and accom-
panying text.
97. WIs. STAT. § 904.01 (1987-88). There is no presumption that uncharged misconduct evi-
dence is relevant. United States v. DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1979).
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vant only if it (1) is of consequence to an issue in the case and (2) tends to
prove or disprove the fact in issue. Once the evidence is deemed relevant, it
is usually admissible.98
1. Fact of Consequence
Under general relevancy principles, the offeror of the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence must first demonstrate that the evidence concerns a fact
of consequence. For instance, if proof of a substantive crime requires the
element of intent, intent is a fact of consequence. Moreover, the fact of
consequence must be substantially in dispute.99 Suppose the defendant is
charged with burglary. The defense asserts that although the defendant en-
tered the building, s/he did not have the requisite intent to steal as defined
by the statute. The element of intent is substantially disputed in this case.
On the other hand, if the defendant denies being the actor, the defendant is
acknowledging that the actor had the requisite intent. 1°° Hence, intent is
not an issue in the case and evidence introduced to demonstrate intent is
irrelevant."' 1 It is important to note that the defendant does not automati-
cally place identity or intent in issue when the defendant enters a guilty
plea. 102
Accordingly, when the trial court determines the issue of relevancy, the
initial focus should be on whether the uncharged misconduct evidence is
introduced for the purpose of demonstrating a fact that is in substantial
98. Wis. STAT. § 904.02 (1987-88). Likewise, if the evidence is irrelvant, it is inadmissible.
See State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 730, 324 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1982); Peasley v. State, 83 Wis.
2d 224, 236, 265 N.W.2d 506, 512 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
99. Wis. R. EVID. 904.04(2) judicial council committee's note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79 (1973)
("[ilt should be excluded if the motive, opportunity, intent, etc., is not substantially disputed
100. State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 89-90, 341 N.W.2d 639, 653 (1984) (Abrahamson, 3.,
dissenting); United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Roth, Under-
standing Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts. A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 297,
312 (1982).
101. For other cases which found that uncharged misconduct evidence was irrelevant under
the intent theory, see State v. Danforth, 129 Wis. 2d 187, 201, 385 N.W.2d 125, 131 (1986) (evi-
dence to prove intent to cruelly maltreat was erroneously admitted since intent to cruelly maltreat
was not an element of Wisconsin Statute Section 940.201 (1985-86)); Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d at 730-
31, 324 N.W.2d at 429-30 (court erred in admitting testimony regarding defendant's sexual mis-
conduct to show intent when the question in the case was consent); State v. Goldsmith, 122 Wis.
2d 754, 757, 364 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1985) (evidence of conversations regarding the de-
fendant's offers to sell cocaine were irrelevant to the charged crime of delivering a controlled
substance because identity was not in issue, knowledge or intent of what was delivered was not in
issue; preparation was not in issue because conversations followed the deliveries and it was not
relevant to show plan because evidence that a person is a drug dealer does not show plan).
102. See Nevin, supra note 17, at 21.
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dispute. The trial court must be careful not to admit evidence that speaks
to an element of the substantive crime without examining both the defense
offered by the defendant, and other factors that would determine if the fact
was in issue. Often an element of the substantive crime is not substantially
disputed and is irrelevant to the case.
2. Probative Value
According to the general principles of relevancy, the trial court's next
inquiry is whether the evidence tends to make the fact of consequence more
or less probable than without the evidence. Evidence is relevant if it has
any tendency to increase the likelihood of a consequential fact proposi-
tion. 03 If the evidence is offered to prove identity by showing that in a
prior incident the defendant followed a modus operandi strikingly similar to
the one followed by the actor in the charged crime, the probative worth of
the evidence increases as the uniqueness or rareness increases. For exam-
ple, offering evidence that several other victims murdered by the defendant
were shot in the back near the fourth cervical vertebra is probative if the
victim the defendant is accused of murdering was also shot in the back near
the fourth cervical vertebra. However, introducing evidence that the de-
fendant burglarized a house left vacant when the owners attended a funeral,
is not probative of the defendant's identity as the actor in another crime
that occurred in the same fashion because this modus operandi is not
unique.
Although uniqueness is required for the purpose of demonstrating the
probative worth of identity, it is not required for all legitimate purposes.
Uniqueness is generally not necessary to show that the defendant had the
necessary intent. For instance, evidence that the defendant has previously
stolen rented vehicles may be probative in the prosecution of the defendant
for the theft of a rented vehicle, if the defense was that the defendant in-
tended to return the vehicle, even though the defendant obtained the rented
vehicle in a different manner."° This is probative because it reflects the
defendant's mental state. The evidence increases the likelihood that the de-
fendant had the requisite intent to steal. On the other hand, possession of
marijuana is not probative of intentionally aiding and abetting the delivery
of heroin.10 5 Possessing marijuana in the past does not make it more likely
103. G. LILLY, supra note 64, at § 2.2; 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 140, at 195 (1985).
104. G. LILLY, supra note 64, § 5.14, at 156.
105. State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 97 n.6, 252 N.W.2d 94, 97 n.6 (1977); see also United
States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1971) (evidence of possession of marijuana not rele-
vant to prove subsequent sale of cocaine); Enriquez v. United States, 314 F.2d 703, 716 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 73:319
UNCHANGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
that the defendant had the requisite intent to deliver heroin. It is only pro-
bative of the fact that the defendant may be a drug user. Since the evidence
only shows character, it should be excluded.
However, when the prosecutor invokes the "doctrine of chances" to
demonstrate intent, the acts, although not unique, must be similar. Accord-
ing to Professor Wigmore, this doctrine rests on the theory that the more
often similar acts occur with similar results, the less likely the defendant
acted with innocent intent. 106 As Professor Wigmore suggests:
[I]f A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun whistling
past his head, he is willing to accept B's bad aim or B's accidental
tripping as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly afterwards the
same thing happens again, and if on the third occasion A receives
B's bullet in his body, the immediate inference (i.e., as a probability,
perhaps not a certainty) is that B shot at A deliberately; because the
chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive similar occa-
sions are extremely small; or (to put it another way) because inad-
vertence or accident is only an abnormal or occasional explanation
for the discharge of a gun at a given object, and therefore the recur-
rence of a similar result (i.e., discharge towards the same object, A)
excludes the fair possibility of such an abnormal cause and points
out the cause as probably a more natural and usual one, i.e., a delib-
erate discharge at A.107
If the acts introduced are dissimilar the "inference of intent arises only if
the inference of bad character is first drawn."' 0 In other words, the proba-
tive value is increased because it is improbable that the similar acts oc-
curred by mere chance."°9
Furthermore, the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence
depends on its nearness in time to the charged crime. 1 If the uncharged
1963) (defendant did not have a fair trial because evidence that the defendant used marijuana on
several occasions to prove a subsequent sale of marijuana may have influenced the jury); Sweatt v.
State, 251 Ark. 650, 652, 473 S.W.2d 913, 914 (1971) (proof that the defendant sold marijuana in
the past was only probative of the issue of the defendant's character).
106. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 300-02.
107. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 302. For a discussion of the doctrine of chances in
Wisconsin, see State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 437-40, 407 N.W.2d 256, 262-63 (1987). But see
generally R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1983) (criticizing the
doctrine of chances).
108. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, § n.5.
109. Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of chances in Wisconsin, see State v. Evers, 139 Wis.
2d 424, 437-40, 407 N.W.2d 256, 262-63 (1987). But see generally R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE,
PROOF AND PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1983) (criticizing the doctrine of chances).
110. See, e.g., Peasley v. State, 83 Wis. 2d at 224, 237 265 N.W.2d 506, 513 (1978) (Abra-
hamson, J., dissenting); Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 250 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1977); Whitty
v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 294, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 (1967), cert. denied sub nor., Whitty v.
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misconduct is so remote in time as to negate any rational connection be-
tween the two acts, the uncharged misconduct evidence is not probative of a
fact in the charged crime.11' To determine whether the probative value of
the evidence is eliminated by the time factor, trial courts must balance the
element of remoteness against the uniqueness of the uncharged
misconduct.I 2
Courts have generally held that a time lapse of one to two years is not so
remote as to eliminate the probative value of the evidence. 13 Problems
occur when courts determine that a period of several years is not too re-
mote. Uniqueness is one explanation for such determinations. For exam-
ple, the act of leaving a blue, initialed handkerchief at each jewel heist is
fairly unique. In this case, the uniqueness may outweigh the fact that the
acts occurred several years apart. In contrast, if the acts do not demon-
strate such uniqueness or striking similarity, they must be deemed inadmis-
sible. At times, courts have permitted the admission of other acts that had
occurred years earlier because they were "similar" to the charged crime
even though the crimes were not unique.' 14
Perhaps the most striking example of this appears in State v. Mink. 1 5
Mink was found guilty of having sexual contact with his four year old
grandson. The state introduced evidence of Mink's alleged sexual contact
with his stepsons that occurred over a period of thirteen to twenty-two
years prior to the charged offense. 116 The court of appeals held that since
the trial court found the facts similar, the evidence was relevant even
Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 959 (1968); D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 103, § 140, at 195. But
see State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 763, 773 (1987).
111. Sanford, 76 Wis. 2d at 81, 250 N.W.2d at 352; see also State v. Sonnenburg, 117 Wis. 2d
159, 171, 344 N.W.2d 95, 101 (1984).
112. Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 815, 235 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1975).
113. Vanlue v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 90, 291 N.W.2d 467,471 (1980) (uncharged act that took
place one and one half years prior to the charged crime was not too remote); Sanford, 76 Wis. 2d
at 82, 250 N.W.2d at 352 (incident that occurred more than one and one half years prior to the
charged offense was not too remote); Hough, 70 Wis. 2d at 814-15, 235 N.W.2d at 538 (one year
between acts was not too remote). But see Sonnenburg, 117 Wis. 2d at 174, 344 N.W.2d at 100
(uncharged incident that occurred fourteen months after the charged crime was sufficient to make
the evidence suspect).
114. See, e.g., Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 773-74. In Friedrich, the court
held that two alleged sexual assaults, occurring four and seven years prior to the charged offense,
were not so remote in time as to eliminate the probative nature of the evidence because of the
"marked similarity" of the acts. Id. at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 774. A close study of the facts reveals
that the acts did not actually contain such "marked similarity." The crimes did not attain the
requisite level of uniqueness to render the evidence probative despite the lapse in time. Thus, the
evidence should have been excluded on the grounds that it lacked probative value.
115. 146 Wis. 2d 1, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).
116. Id. at 16, 429 N.W.2d at 105.
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though the incidents occurred between thirteen and twenty-two years ear-
ier.117 The court of appeals did not discuss in what manner these crimes
were unique nor why their uniqueness would overcome the time lapse of
twenty-two years.
Simply labeling the charged and uncharged acts as "similar" should not
automatically allow prosecutors to introduce evidence of those acts that oc-
curred several years before the charged offense. Therefore, courts should
require prosecutors to explain, on the record, why the charged act and the
uncharged act are so unique that a span of several years between the acts
would not render the evidence too remote in time. As with legitimate pur-
poses, the term "similar" is not a magic password opening the door to any
evidence the prosecutor offers.118 Courts should take a common sense ap-
proach to this problem and balance the uniqueness of the acts with the
remoteness element. Most importantly, courts should ascertain whether
the evidence is probative because of its uniqueness despite the lapse of time
between the acts.
Before analyzing evidence under Section 904.04(2), the prosecution
must articulate its theory of relevancy to the court. Once articulated, there
are several steps the court should take when further analyzing the relevancy
of the uncharged misconduct evidence. First, the court is required to deter-
mine if the purpose for which the evidence is offered is in substantial dis-
pute. Courts cannot determine this exclusively by examining the
substantive law; rather, it is necessary to consider the defense offered, as
well as other factors before making their determination. Second, the evi-
dence must be probative of the fact in issue, having a tendency to prove or
disprove a fact that is in substantial dispute. Furthermore, it is essential
that the time lapse between the uncharged act and the charged crime is not
so great that it eliminates any probative value.
B. The Second Prong - Legitimate Purposes
Once the prosecution's theory of relevance has been carefully articu-
lated and put on the record, the trial judge has the ability to determine
whether the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose. If, for example, the
prosecution explains the theory of relevancy in terms of intent, but the un-
charged misconduct evidence does not prove intent, only propensity, the
evidence should be excluded.
117. Id.
118. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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It is imperative to note that a trial judge should not be misled by labels
the prosecution attaches to evidence during a hearing for admissibility. 19
The purpose offered for admission should not be treated as magic pass-
words whose mere utterance will allow in whatever evidence is offered. 2
Instead, the trial judge must scrutinize the evidence to insure that the the-
ory of admissibility is grounded upon more than simply a list of words that
effect immediate admission of evidence. 2' Because of the large number of
legitimate purposes available, this Comment will concentrate on the two
which appear particularly troublesome: plan and motive.
1. Plan
a. Plan Theory in General
The reason for admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct to prove
plan is that it does not merely involve an inference as to the defendant's
character, but demonstrates that the defendant's conduct is caused by a
conscious commitment to a larger goal of which the crime charged is only a
part.122 Thus, this evidence is admitted to show the larger objective and not
the defendant's criminal propensity. 23 However, if this evidence is not
carefully scrutinized, it can serve as a means to admit evidence which shows
the defendant's criminal propensity rather than a planned course of action.
Since plan is generally not an element of the crime, the evidence estab-
lishing a plan must be relevant to an ultimate issue in the case.124 The plan
may be useful to identify the actors who committed the crime.1 25 In this
instance, the prosecution must show that the charged crime and the un-
charged misconduct are so similar that they are idiosyncratic. 2 6 For exam-
ple, evidence that prior victims were shot from behind at close range near
the fourth cervical vertebra may be admissible to identify the defendant as
the murderer, where the victim in the charged crime was also shot from
behind at close range near the fourth cervical vertebra. 127
119. C. WIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5239.
120. Goodwin, 492 F.2d at 1155.
121. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 15, at 183.
122. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5244.
123. See Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 KAN. L. REv. 411,
419 (1972); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1956).
124. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5244.
125. C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 558-59 (3d ed. 1984).
126. Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 12.
127. People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924, 932 (1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790
(1946); see also Note, Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Crimes: Instructions to the
Jury, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 131, 132 (1947).
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Furthermore, evidence of plan is admissible to show intent of the ac-
tor.'28 For instance, evidence that the defendant possessed a number of
credit cards, not in the defendant's name, may be relevant to show that the
fraudulent statements that were made in procuring credit cards were part of
a larger plan to use fake cards to swindle merchants. 29 Finally, evidence of
plan is also admissible to prove the completion of an act.' 30 For example,
evidence that the defendant bribed a zoning board member to obtain a
favorable variance may be admissible to show that other members of the
board voting on the issue were also bribed. 1 ' If the evidence is not proba-
tive of an ultimate issue in the case, the evidence must be rejected. Like-
wise, if identity, intent, or the commission of the crime is not in issue, the
evidence cannot be admitted under plan.' 3
2
b. The Plan Theory in Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, the term "plan" has been defined as:
[A] design or scheme formed to accomplish some particular pur-
pose.... Evidence showing a plan establishes a definite prior design,
plan, or scheme which includes the doing of the act charged. As
Wigmore states, there must be "such a concurrence of common fea-
tures that the various acts are materially to be explained as caused
by a general plan of which they are the individual
manifestations."133
For uncharged misconduct evidence to be admissible under the plan
theory, the other acts must be a step leading to the charged crime. If the
other acts are separate incidents, not related steps in a plan, the evidence is
inadmissible as a plan.13 4 In some cases it appears that the uncharged acts
are not committed in furtherance of a plan. For example, in State v.
128. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 125, § 190, at 558-59; see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 7, § 5244.
129. United States v. Matlock, 558 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977); see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5244.
130. C. McCORMICK, supra note 125, § 190, at 558-59; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 7, § 5244.
131. Comment, A Proposed Analytical'Method for the Determination of the Admissibility of
Evidence of Other Offenses in California, 7 UCLA L. REv. 463, 472-73 (1960); see also C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5244.
132. United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1978).
133. State v. Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d 741, 756-57, 317 N.W.2d 493, 500 (1982) (quoting Sprag-
gin, 77 Wis. 2d at 99, 252 N.W.2d at 98).
134. Id.; see also State v. Harris, 123 Wis. 2d 231, 239, 365 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Ct. App. 1985);
Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 22. When the prosecution's only evidence is proof of the commis-
sion of several similar crimes, the only plan established is a plan to commit a series of acts of the
same kind. Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 19.
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Rutchik,135 the defendant was convicted of the burglary of a home left un-
occupied while the owners attended a funeral. 136 The trial court admitted
evidence showing that three years prior to the incident, the defendant had
been convicted of burglarizing a house left temporarily vacant while the
owners were attending a funeral. 3 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision, holding that it was admissible to show plan. 3 '
There are several problems with characterizing this evidence as admissi-
ble under the plan theory. First, the acts cannot be "explained as caused by
a general plan of which they are individual manifestations."13 9 In order to
satisfy this definition of plan, the first (uncharged) burglary would have to
have been part of a scheme or design leading to the commission of the
charged burglary."4 For example, if the defendant committed the first bur-
glary as a trial run for a second, more difficult burglary, this would be a
legitimate use of the plan theory. 4' Instead, in Rutchik, the facts are sepa-
rate, albeit similar, instances showing only the defendant's propensity to
commit burglary.
Furthermore, the plan was not relevant to an ultimate issue in the case.
Since plan in and of itself was not an ultimate issue, it must have been
relevant to some ultimate issue such as identity, intent or the commission of
an act. The court first argued that the evidence was relevant to the identity
or modus operandi of the actor.142 It explained that the close factual simi-
larities between the crime charged and the previous incident established a
modus operandi.'43 However, these two crimes do not exhibit the requisite
degree of uniqueness necessary when using plan to establish the ultimate
issue of identity. In order to use the plan theory to establish identity, it is
imperative that the modus operandi in both crimes be either exceptional or
idiosyncratic.'" In this case, the burglarizing of a house left temporarily
vacant because the owners were attending a funeral was not so unique as to
135. 116 Wis. 2d 61, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984).
136. Id. at 64, 341 N.W.2d at 641. Although the deceased sister did not live in the home that
had been burglarized, the obituary notice listed that address. Id. at 69 n.3, 341 N.W.2d at 643 n.3.
137. Id. at 65, 341 N.W.2d at 641.
138. Id. at 68, 341 N.W.2d at 643. The court also held that it was admissible to show identity
as well as intent. Id.
139. Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d at 757, 317 N.W.2d at 500 (quoting Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d at 99,
252 N.W.2d at 98).
140. See Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 70, 341 N.W.2d at 644.
141. Here, the defendant has a goal that encompasses both the charged and uncharged
crimes. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 3.
142. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 70, 341 N.W.2d at 644.
143. Id. The similarity between the two crimes is simply that both houses were burglarized
while the occupants were attending a funeral.
144. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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establish the identity of the actor.145 Given these facts, the plan evidence
should not have been admitted to show identity.
The court also stated that the plan evidence was relevant to show in-
tent.14 In Rutchik, the defendant denied that he committed the burglary;
therefore, he implicitly conceded that the actual perpetrator had the requi-
site intent.147 Under these circumstances, intent is not an issue and the
introduction of plan evidence to establish the ultimate issue of intent is not
appropriate.
The evidence failed under the plan theory for two reasons: (1) there was
no evidence indicating that the uncharged act was committed as a step to-
wards or in furtherance of the charged crime; and (2) it was not probative
of an ultimate issue in the case. Consequently, the uncharged misconduct
evidence should not have been admitted.
To complicate matters further, Wisconsin has adopted a "greater lati-
tude" approach in cases involving sexual offenses.' 48 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has stated that this greater latitude of proof is "not so much
a matter of relaxing the general rule ... as it is a matter of placing testi-
mony concerning other acts or incidents within one of the well established
exceptions to such rule."' 4 9 This doctrine permits exactly what the un-
145. See Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 88-89, 341 N.W.2d at 652 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
But see id. at 81, 341 N.W.2d at 649 (Steinmetz, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Steinmetz stated that even though this type of method of burglary occurs frequently, "it is
a particularly stylized method of committing burglary" and therefore is probative of identity. Id.
at 81-82, 341 N.W.2d 648-49. However, if a number of people are committing crimes in this
manner, how can it be probative in determining that this particular defendant was the one who
committed the crime in this particular instance? A defendant cannot be identified as the actor of
the charged crime by committing commonplace crimes except by reference to the prohibited infer-
ence of propensity. J. WErNSTEaiN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, % 404[16].
146. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 70, 341 N.W.2d at 644. See Roth, supra note 100, at 309-10.
147. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 89-90, 341 N.W.2d at 653 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
148. See Hendrickson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 275, 277-79, 212 N.W.2d 481, 481-82 (1973). This
approach first appeared in Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 630, 55 N.W. 1035, 1040 (1893). See also
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 38, 398 N.W.2d at 780 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that this
proposition was extremely narrow in scope); State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 664-66, 247 N.W.2d
696, 705-06 (1976) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Courts have frequently utilized this doctrine to
broaden the scope of this evidence to allow in character evidence. See, e.g., Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d
at 19, 398 N.W.2d at 771; Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 284 N.W.2d 666, 672 (1979); Tarrell,
74 Wis. 2d at 658, 247 N.W.2d at 703.
149. Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 279, 212 N.W.2d at 482. In Friedrich, the court rationalized
broadening the exceptions by holding that due to the repulsive nature of these sexual offenses, the
jury may not believe that anyone could commit such acts. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 28, 398
N.W.2d at 775. Therefore, according to the supreme court, the only way the prosecution could
convince the jury that the defendant committed the crime is to parade the past history of the
defendant's "plans, schemes and motives." Id.
If this evidence actually amounted to a plan, scheme or motive, the court would not need the
"greater latitude" doctrine. Instead, the prosecution is really parading the defendant's past acts in
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charged misconduct doctrine prohibits. One should not be allowed to cir-
cumvent the uncharged misconduct rule by expanding the definitions of the
legitimate purposes for which this evidence may be introduced.1 50
In Hendrickson v. State,151 the defendant was convicted of incest and
taking indecent liberties with a child. At trial, the prosecutor was permit-
ted to introduce evidence of other acts of intercourse the defendant had
with the complaining witness-daughter and two other daughters. 152 The
court held that given the greater latitude of proof allowed in sexual offenses,
evidence of the uncharged misconduct was admissible under the plan the-
ory. 15 3 The court failed to provide an analytical framework for its findings.
However, it did quote an opinion of another jurisdiction which stated,
"[t]he older sister's testimony is relevant to show ... [a] general plan to use
his daughters to gratify his lust, passion and sexual desires."154
Based on the facts of this case, there is no indication that the defendant
had a "plan" to assault his daughter. There is nothing in the opinion that
suggests the defendant assaulted one daughter as a step in a plan leading to
the charged crime - the assault of the other daughter. Instead, the word
plan was treated as a magic password to admit evidence which proved only
propensity. A blanket statement that the evidence "fits" under the plan
theory is not enough. There must be some evidence that the defendant
committed the act in furtherance of a plan. These acts were not committed
for the purpose of achieving some ultimate goal; rather, they were all single
acts of the same kind.155
It is easy to understand how the "greater latitude" approach gained ac-
ceptance. Judges, outraged by the abhorrant nature of sexual offenses, have
front of the jury to demonstrate that the defendant has a propensity to commit these acts. The
double inference is apparent in this situation. After hearing of the defendant's previous alleged
sexual assaults, the jury infers that the defendant has the propensity to commit these acts and
deserves punishment. Next, the jury infers that since the defendant has the propensity to commit
sexual assaults, the defendant has committed the charged sexual assault. This evidence does not
help the prosecution convince the jury that someone could actually commit this crime but it does
help the prosecution to unfairly convince the jury that the defendant committed this crime by
employing an impermissible use of character evidence.
150. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 62.2 (citing Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 277, 212
N.W.2d at 482). Professor Wigmore stated that courts that do not expressly recognize a sexual
deviant character exception may effectively allow such an exception in sex offenses by expansively
interpreting various well established exceptions to the character evidence rule. Id.
151. 61 Wis. 2d 275, 212 N.W.2d 481 (1973).
152. Id. at 276, 212 N.W.2d at 481.
153. Id. at 282, 212 N.W.2d at 484. The court also admitted this evidence under the motive
and intent theories. Id.
154. Id. at 281, 212 N.W.2d at 483-84 (quoting Staggers v. State, 120 Ga. App. 875, 876, 172
S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 1969)).
155. See also Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 24, 398 N.W.2d at 773.
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admitted evidence establishing only criminal propensity under the guise of
the "greater latitude" doctrine. However, outrage is not an acceptable basis
for enlarging already broad definitions.1 56 Wisconsin should abolish the
"greater latitude" approach, because arguments for admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence to show propensity in sexual assault cases are no more
persuasive than in any other case.157
The interests protected by this rule are being violated to the same extent
as nonsexual assault cases when evidence is introduced to show propensity
in sexual assault cases. 5 The relevancy problem does not change. More-
over, the jury may still make legally impermissible inferences from the evi-
dence. In fact, given the nature of the act, the jury is more likely to make
such impermissible inferences. Finally, there is still the possibility of violat-
ing the defendant's constitutionally protected rights. The categorical ap-
proach taken in this area is unwarranted. Admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence in these cases should be determined by the same case
by case assessment used in other cases.
Courts should also narrow the application of the plan theory in general.
First, courts should find an overall objective tying the uncharged miscon-
duct with the charged crime. In other words, the defendant must commit
the uncharged act in furtherance of some larger scheme or goal. Second,
the plan evidence must be relevant to an ultimate issue in the case. The best
approach is for the trial court to insist that the prosecuting attorney ex-
plain, on the record, how the uncharged misconduct evidence furthers some
larger goal, and why it is relevant to a specific ultimate issue. If these re-
quirements are not met, the evidence does not establish a plan and should
be excluded.
156. See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual
Offense, 40 U. MIAMI L. RaV. 217, 218 (1985). In Friedrich, 135 Wis.2d at 31-34, 398 N.W.2d at
776-78, the majority cited several reports and law review articles regarding the devastating effects
sexual abuse has on children. There is little doubt that child abuse has become a serious problem
in this country. However, when the legislature has spoken, as it has in Section 904.04(2), the
court is bound by the legislature's decision. Consequently, the court is not in a position to admit
character evidence under the unfounded belief that it is the solution to the nation's child abuse
problem. It is the court's duty to strictly adhere to the principles of Section 904.04(2).
157. Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 342-46, 116 A.2d 867, 873-74 (1955)
(Pennsylvania had a liberal policy of admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct in sexual of-
fense cases); see also Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 38, 398 N.W.2d at 779 (Heffernan, C.i., dissenting)
("[N]o reasons are ever given why evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence
should be allowed in a sex crime case. No reasons are given because there are no reasons that
withstand scrutiny."); Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d at 667, 247 N.W.2d at 705-07 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
158. For a discussion of the interests protected by the uncharged misconduct rule, see supra
notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
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2. Motive
a. The Motive Theory in General
Motive is generally considered a state of mind or an emotion that causes
a person to act in a certain way.'5 9 Similar to plan, motive is not an ulti-
mate issue in the case and must be probative of some element that is in
issue."6  Motive evidence may be offered to prove identity, intent, or that a
crime actually occurred.16 1
If the prosecution uses motive evidence to prove identity, the motive
must be peculiar to the defendant.162 If the prosecution introduces evidence
of motive to show intent, the uncharged act may be dissimilar to the
charged act. 163 For instance, detection of an uncharged fraud may motivate
the defendant to murder the person who detected the fraud. In this case,
the uncharged act of fraud supplied the motive for the charged act of mur-
der despite the dissimilarity of two acts. Furthermore, the ultimate issue
for which this evidence is submitted must be in issue. If it is not in issue,
the evidence is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.
b. The Motive Theory in Wisconsin
Motive is the "reason which leads the mind to desire the result of the
act."' 16 However, it appears that this definition has been applied so broadly
at times that it has become synonymous with the definition of propensity.165
Evidence of uncharged misconduct has been introduced even though it does
159. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240. Motive is not synonymous with in-
tent even though some courts treat it as such. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109,
1121 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bland, 432 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1970).
160. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240.
161. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 3:16; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 125, at 562; C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240.
162. If the defendant is the only one who would entertain the motive, the evidence would be
admissible to show identity. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. The more common scenario
concerns motive of the type shared by a large number of people. For example, evidence that the
defendant is motivated to commit robbery because of a drug addiction is evidence of motive
shared by many people. Because motives are rarely peculiar to one individual, motive evidence
has proven to be troublesome. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 3:16; see also C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240.
163. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 3:16.
164. State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 260, 378 N.W.2d 272, 279 (1985) (citing Baker v.
State, 120 Wis. 135, 145-46, 97 N.W. 566, 570 (1903)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has distin-
guished motive from plan by holding that motive explains why a person acted in a particular
manner while plan explains the intentional steps taken by the person to reach the goal. Balistreri,
106 Wis. 2d at 756, 317 N.W.2d at 500.
165. See, e.g., Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 51-52, 398 N.W.2d at 785 (Heffernan, C. J., dissent-
ing); Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 255, 378 N.W.2d at 277; Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 284
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not demonstrate a specific motivation but a generalized urge. This genera-
lized urge is not probative of the ultimate issue of identity, intent, or that a
crime was actually committed. Instead, it shows character. This occurred
in State v. Fishnick.166
In Fishnick, the state introduced evidence claiming that the defendant
offered D.F., a thirteen year old girl, twenty dollars to show him her vaginal
area, to prove that the defendant had sexual conduct with C.S., a three year
old girl, seven days later. 67 On appeal, the court held that D.F.'s testi-
mony was admissible to show motive, 6 ' because the defendant's interac-
tions with C.S. and D.F. were motivated by the need for sexual
gratification. 69 The court concluded that the uncharged misconduct with
D.F. provided a motive for the alleged sexual contact with C.S.
The problem with characterizing this evidence as proof of motive is that
it concludes Fishnick was motivated by a generalized urge - sexual gratifi-
cation - to commit the charged crime. Scholars have raised doubts re-
garding the usefulness of a generalized urge to show that the defendant
committed a crime, 7° One author has suggested that simply because a per-
son was motivated by a sexual urge does not prove that the defendant in-
tended to satisfy those desires. 171
In Fishnick, the court determined that the defendant acted because he
had a motivation to sexually gratify himself. From this determination, it
was concluded that a crime was committed and that the defendant was the
one who committed the crime. However, sexual gratification is nothing
more than a generalized urge showing the defendant's propensity to commit
sexually deviant acts. Thus, the chain of inferences was as follows: Because
the defendant has made sexual advancements to a young girl in the past, he
has the propensity to commit sexually deviant acts and therefore has com-
N.W.2d 666, 672 (1979); Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d at 663, 247 N.W.2d at 705 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
166. 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985). For a more in-depth discussion of the facts of
this case, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
167. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 250, 378 N.W.2d at 275. The defense was that the crime did
not occur. Id. at 258, 378 N.W.2d at 278.
168. Id. at 261, 378 N.W.2d at 280. It is important to note that the prosecution did not rely
on the "greater latitude" standard expressed in Hendrickson. Id. at 256, 378 N.W.2d at 277.
169. Id. at 260, 378 N.W.2d at 279.
170. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 2, t 404[08]; J. WIGMORE, supra note
66, at 1349; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240 (there are doubts when the supposed
motivation is so general); see also E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 3:16 (motivation of sexual
satisfaction has little, if any, probative value on the issue of identity).
171. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240 (citing Lacy, Admissibility of Evi-
dence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 OR. L. REv. 267 (1952)).
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mitred this sexually deviant act. To admit evidence of a generalized urge to
show "motive," defeats the principle of Section 904.04(2).172
The motive definition becomes even broader when courts rely on the
"greater latitude" standard invoked in cases involving sexual offenses. 173
This doctrine is used under the motive theory the same way it is used under
the plan theory. The definition of motive is enlarged to allow the admission
of inadmissible character evidence in sex offenses.174
In order to adhere to the letter and spirit of Section 904.04(2), the court
abolish the "greater latitude" standard. As discussed above, there is no
justification for evoking this doctrine. 175 Furthermore, the court should re-
strict evidence of uncharged acts in accordance with the definition of mo-
tive. Again, purposes for which the evidence is being offered cannot be
treated as a magic password to admit otherwise prohibited character evi-
dence. The uncharged misconduct evidence has to establish more than a
generalized urge in order to explain why the person acted in a particular
manner. Courts should find that the uncharged misconduct induced the
defendant to commit the charged crime before allowing the evidence to
come in under motive. That the defendant has committed an act in the past
and therefore the defendant had the motivation to commit the charged act
establishes only that the defendant has a propensity to commit the act. This
type of manipulation elicits all the dangers Section 904.04(2) is designed to
prevent. By masking character evidence as evidence of motive, the prosecu-
tion is introducing irrelevant evidence, inducing the jury to make impermis-
sible inferences, and violating the defendant's constitutional rights. 76
172. Since Fishnick, courts have frequently used motive to introduce uncharged misconduct
under the theory that the defendant's motivation was to obtain sexual gratification. See, e.g.,
Mink, 146 Wis. 2d at 16, 429 N.W.2d at 104-05 (evidence of the defendant's sexual contact with
his stepsons approximately twenty years prior to the charged incident was admissible to show
motive for the charged crime of sexual contact with his four year old grandson); State v. Conley,
141 Wis. 2d 384, 398, 416 N.W.2d 69, 75 (Ct. App. 1987), vacated on other grounds sub noa.,
Wisconsin v. Conley, 487 U.S. 1230 (1988) (evidence that the defendant had sexual intercourse
with his daughter several times prior to the charged incident illuminated the defendant's motive
for sexual gratification).
173. For a discussion of the "greater latitude" standard, see supra notes 148-55 and accompa-
nying text.
174. See, e.g., Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 284 N.W.2d 666, 672-73 (1979) (applying
the elements of the "greater latitude" standard to admit evidence that the defendant supplied
minors with beer and marijuana and either had or sought to have sexual intercourse with other
young girls demonstrated the defendant's "motive" of obtaining sexual gratification, which in turn
proved that the defendant had intercourse with the girls in the charged crime).
175. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
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3. The Smorgasbord Approach
The "smorgasbord" approach, according to Professors Wright and Gra-
ham, is not a traditional purpose for which uncharged misconduct evidence
may be introduced. Rather, it is a technique used when a legitimate pur-
pose for introducing the evidence is not present. The purposes listed in
Section 904.04(2) are not mutually exclusive."' At times, evidence may be
admissible under more than one theory. However, the prosecution may not
list several purposes in the hope that one may be appropriate. Instead, in
situations in which there may be more than one legitimate reason for intro-
ducing the evidence, the trial court should direct the prosecuting attorney
to articulate reasons why each purpose is appropriate. 7 '
This technique was used in State v. Rutchik.179 In Rutchik, the evidence
was admitted to show preparation, plan, identity and intent."' However,
none of these theories legitimately applied to the case.' 81 Preparation did
not apply because demonstrating that the defendant prepared for the
charged crime by committing a similar crime in the past only proved crimi-
nal propensity. Likewise, plan was inappropriate because the evidence did
not demonstrate that the uncharged act (the first burglary) was committed
in furtherance of the charged crime. Furthermore, because the crimes were
not unique, the evidence did not prove identity. Finally, intent was irrele-
vant because intent was not an issue in this case.
Courts should prohibit prosecutors from using the "smorgasbord" tech-
nique to introduce evidence of uncharged misconduct. Furthermore, appel-
late courts should demand that trial courts carefully analyze each theory
before using it as a basis to admit such evidence. It is worth repeating that
treating these purposes as magic passwords is strictly forbidden. In order to
adhere to the principles of Section 904.04(2), courts may only admit evi-
dence that is legitimately offered to prove something other than propensity.
177. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d at 662, 247 N.W.2d at 704 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see, eg.,
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 24, 398 N.W.2d at 773 (motive and plan); Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 261,
378 N.W.2d at 280 (motive and plan); Conley, 141 Wis. 2d at 400, 416 N.W.2d at 76 (motive and
intent).
178. C. WRiGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240.
179. 116 Wis. 2d 61, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see
supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. For an excellent analysis of the "smorgasbord" ap-
proach in Wisconsin, see C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5240.
180. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 68, 341 N.W.2d at 643.
181. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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C. The Third Prong - Balancing
Because of the nature of uncharged misconduct evidence, its admission
is often extremely prejudicial to the defendant. In fact, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has noted that such evidence may distract the jury, induce
jurors to infer that the defendant has a propensity to commit such acts, and
invite punishment of the defendant because the defendant is, for reasons
other than the offense charged, a bad person.' 2 Since there is a danger that
this evidence is unfairly prejudicial toward the defendant, the Wisconsin
Legislature has adopted a balancing test which permits courts to exclude
evidence though it is otherwise admissible.
This balancing test is the final step in the three-prong test. It requires
the trial court to balance the probative value of the uncharged misconduct
evidence against the danger of undue prejudice to the defendant. Accord-
ing to the judicial council committee's notes, evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct should be excluded if "under all the circumstances the danger of
undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value under section
904.03." 183 Balancing the strength and necessity of the evidence against the
likelihood that the jury would make impermissible inferences is a difficult
task for trial judges. Time constraints serve to further hinder judges in this
context.' 8 4 In order to properly analyze the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence under the balancing test, courts should consider several factors relat-
ing to the nature and necessity of the evidence.
1. Balancing
When examining this evidence, trial courts need to determine if there is
any less prejudicial evidence available to the state that would prove the
same fact that the uncharged misconduct evidence is designed to prove.
The state may not forego the use of less prejudicial evidence to utilize preju-
182. State v. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d 510, 524, 343 N.W.2d 108, 116 (1984); see also Patterson,
supra note 27, at 334 (juries tend to overvalue other crimes evidence). For an examination of the
dangers involved in introducing evidence of uncharged misconduct, see supra notes 20-39 and
accompanying text.
183. Wis. R. EVID. 904.04(2) judicial council committee's note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79
(1973). Wisconsin Statute Section 904.03 states, "[allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1987-88). The federal jurisdiction
has adopted the same balancing approach. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) federal advisory committee's
note, cited in 59 Wis. 2d R79 (1973).
184. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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dicial uncharged misconduct evidence.' 85 Suppose the prosecution wants to
prove that a particular rifle belonged to the defendant. The prosecution
could introduce evidence that the defendant was convicted of reckless use of
a weapon and that the conviction involved the same rifle. However, evi-
dence that the rifle was registered to the defendant is as readily available
and less prejudicial. Under these circumstances, the trial court should per-
mit the prosecution to introduce only the firearm registration documents
and not the reckless use of a weapon conviction.
Trial courts should also consider whether there is sufficient evidence on
the record to prove the particular fact without introducing uncharged mis-
conduct evidence. If there is ample evidence on the record which seems
likely to convince the trier of fact on that point, the trial court should ex-
clude the uncharged misconduct evidence because of the danger of unfair
prejudice."8 6 As the court warned in Whitty, prosecutors cannot introduce
uncharged misconduct evidence when sufficient evidence is already on the
record without running a serious risk of violating the defendant's right to a
fair trial.187
Another factor trial courts must consider under the balancing prong is
the nature of the uncharged act. When the uncharged act is more socially
unacceptable than the charged crime, the trial court should favor excluding
the evidence on the grounds that the prejudicial nature of the evidence sub-
stantially outweighs its probative value.' For instance, evidence that the
defendant, charged with robbery, had previously been convicted of a sexual
offense, may be so substantially prejudicial compared to its probative nature
185. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 8:16; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note
15, at 184; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5250. For examples where reviewing
courts have held evidence inadmissible because there was less prejudicial evidence available, see
United States v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226, 228 (7th Cir. 1967) (use of prison "mug shot" of accused for
purposes of identification held too prejudicial); People v. Ogunmola, 39 Cal. 3d 120, 701 P.2d
1173, 1176, 215 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858 (1985) (where the California Supreme Court held that the
prosecution should have conducted physical demonstrations to prove that a step at the foot of a
gynecologist's examining table did not make sexual contact impossible instead of introducing ex-
tremely prejudicial testimony from alleged victims of previous uncharged sexual assaults).
186. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 103, § 140, at 203. See, e.g., Goodwin, 492
F.2d at 1152 (in view of the complete absence of need for the evidence, this case is a dramatic
example of the kind of prejudice the uncharged misconduct rule was designed to protect).
187. Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 297, 149 N.W.2d at 565. The court held that admitting such
evidence has a needless prejudicial effect. Id.
188. See generally Krivosha, Lansworth & Piresh, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Us-
ing Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REv. 657, 659 (1981);
Sharpe, Two Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of
Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 556, 556-67 (1984).
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as to warrant exclusion. 189 In contrast, when the evidence is a more accept-
able act, the danger of prejudice is not as high.190 For example, the mere
act of making a statement is not as likely to warrant exclusion. 9 This does
not mean that a "neutral act" can never be so prejudicial as to substantially
outweigh its probative nature. Instead, neutral acts are less likely to be
overly prejudicial compared to more socially unacceptable acts. Under
either circumstance, trial courts should weigh the prejudicial nature of the
evidence against its probative value according to the particular facts in the
case.
Furthermore, trial courts should consider the strength of the uncharged
misconduct evidence.1 92 If the evidence contains little probative value yet a
high risk of prejudice, trial courts should not admit the evidence. For ex-
ample, introducing evidence that the defendant had made sexual advances
to an eighteen year old woman, to prove that the defendant sexually as-
saulted a fourteen year old girl, is substantially more prejudicial than proba-
tive. 93 Here, the probative value of the evidence is negligible. Because of
the slight probative value of the evidence, and the substantial danger of
prejudice to the defendant, this evidence falls squarely on the prejudicial
side of the balancing test. Therefore, this evidence should be held
inadmissible.
Courts should not only evaluate the prejudicial nature of the evidence,
they should also consider the other factors listed in Wisconsin Statute Sec-
tion 904.03. For instance, uncharged misconduct evidence should not be
admitted if there is a substantial danger of confusing the jury,194 or if its
introduction would foster undue delays.' 95 If the trial court is not in a
position to properly balance the evidence during the prosecution's case-in-
189. United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3d Cir. 1976) (when there is a need for
uncharged misconduct evidence, courts should minimize the potential prejudice by excluding in-
formation regarding the nature of the felony or by using a less prejudicial offense).
190. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66
IOWA L. REV. 777, 789-90 (1981).
191. See, eg., Hough, 70 Wis. 2d at 815, 235 N.W.2d at 538.
192. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 18, § 8:24; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7,
§ 5250. e
193. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 26, 398 N.W.2d at 774; see also United States v. Hernandez,
780 F.2d 113, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (evidence of defendant's "participation" in a fight was so
tenuous that its slim probative value was overwhelmed by its prejudicial effect); Foskey, 636 F.2d
at 524 (the uncharged act involved accompanying an individual carrying concealed narcotics).
194. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, at 1215; Sharpe, supra note 188, at 562 (presenting
uncharged misconduct may be distracting to the jury).
195. Patterson, supra note 27, at 334.
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chief, it should permit the prosecution to introduce uncharged act evidence
only in its rebuttal. 196
2. Limiting Instructions
If the evidence is prejudicial but passes the third prong of the admissibil-
ity test, limiting instructions may be given. These instructions should direct
the jury to only consider the uncharged misconduct evidence for the limited
purpose for which it was introduced. Thus, the jury may not conclude that,
given the defendant's bad character, the defendant must have committed
the crime charged.'9 7 Usually, if the defendant does not request a limiting
instruction, the reviewing court will not find error in the trial court's failure
to give one.198 However, if the trial court refuses to issue a limiting instruc-
tion after the defendant has requested one, there may be grounds for finding
reversible error. 199
Limiting instructions are designed to cure any prejudicial effect sur-
rounding the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence.2 00 In fact,
there is a presumption that if the instructions are properly given, the jury
will not use this evidence for illegitimate purposes.20' However, scholars
have questioned this presumption.202 As Justice Jackson stated, "[t]he na-
ive assumption that prejudicial effect can be overcome by instructions to the
jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigating fiction."20 3 Given
the limited effectiveness these instructions have on the jury, courts should
not admit extremely prejudicial evidence, relying solely on limiting instruc-
196. See United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-50 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stanley, 411 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Harris, 123 Wis. 2d at
237-38, 365 N.W.2d at 926 (quoting United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979)).
197. See, eg., Wis. J.I. - Crim. 275 (1983).
198. See United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1089 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868
(1978). But see Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d at 100-01, 525 N.W.2d at 99.
199. Wisconsin Statute Section 901.06 states that when the evidence is available for a limited
purpose, the court shall give a limiting instruction upon request; Wis. STAT. § 901.06 (1987-88);
see also United States v. Yopp, 577 F.2d 362, 366 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. McFadyen-
Snider, 552 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, supra note 15, at 186-87.
200. See, eg., Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 262, 378 N.W.2d at 280; State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d
227, 238, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 119 Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984)
(limiting instructions given prior to uncharged misconduct testimony were sufficient to temper
any prejudicial effect).
201. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 238, 341 N.W.2d at 721.
202. See Proposed Rules, supra note 53, at 332 (the effectiveness of cautionary instructions is
doubtful); Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 263; Nevin, supra note 17, at 24.
203. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted).
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tions to cure its unfair effects. Courts need to evaluate this evidence in a
realistic light. They should exercise great care in determining whether a
limiting instruction could cure any prejudicial effect. If a jury is likely to
make character inferences prohibited by Section 904.04(2), even with the
limiting instruction, the evidence should be excluded.
Although the general rules of evidence favor admissibility in close cases,
this bias has been called into question when the evidence pertains to un-
charged misconduct.2° The drafters of the Proposed Rules of the Ameri-
can Bar Association advocate a change in the balancing test. Under the
proposed plan, the prosecution is required to convince the court that the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice.2 °5 This proposal puts the burden of proof squarely on the prose-
cution. It also makes admissibility more difficult. The need to strengthen
the uncharged misconduct evidence rule is apparent when one examines the
excessively prejudicial effect this evidence has on the defendant's case.
Currently, uncharged misconduct evidence is excluded under the third
prong if its prejudicial nature substantially outweighs its probative value.
To determine this, courts examine the nature and the necessity of the evi-
dence. Evidence may also be excluded if the other factors listed in Section
904.03 apply. Furthermore, if the court determines that evidence is not
substantially prejudicial, it should give a limiting instruction. However,
courts should not treat limiting instructions as magical cures and should
exclude the evidence if a limiting instruction would not be effective. Fi-
nally, even though general rules of relevancy favor admissibility, that bias
has been questioned when it is applied to uncharged misconduct evidence.
The new proposal from the American Bar Association Committee suggests
that uncharged misconduct evidence be ruled admissible only when its pro-
bative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial nature.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment does not recommend a prohibition against the use of all
uncharged misconduct evidence. It does, however, advocate narrowing the
scope of the character evidence rule. There are strong policy reasons for
strict adherence to this rule. Such factors include the need to prevent juries
from hearing irrelevant evidence and making impermissible character infer-
ences, and the need to prevent the violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.
204. Proposed Rules, supra note 53, at 331.
205. Id. at 333.
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In order to ensure that the Wisconsin judiciary will adhere to the letter
and spirit of Section 904.04(2), the Wisconsin Supreme Court should take
affirmative action. It is imperative that the court hand down a decision that
demonstrates strict compliance with Section 904.04(2). The first step that
the court should take is to show that it will not tolerate admission of evi-
dence that is not proven to be relevant. This includes all evidence that is
not in substantial dispute, not probative, or is too remote in time. It is
fundamental that if evidence is not relevant, it is inadmissible. Next, the
court should narrowly define the legitimate purposes for which the evidence
may be offered. The court should allow prosecutors to treat these purposes
as magical passwords. If the prosecution utilizes the plan theory, it must
demonstrate a plan. The mere utterance of the appropriate words should
not engender admissibility. Finally, a more strict approach to the balancing
test is needed. It is important to remember that the key to this prong is
fairness. Finding that the evidence has some probative value does not end
the inquiry. There are uncharged acts that are so prejudicial that it would
be unfair to admit them even though they are probative.
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